European Identity in Benelux


Introduction

In this final paper I have chosen to discuss and reflect upon the concepts of European identity and identification, with a focus on the Benelux countries. My overall approach towards the concepts is culture/memory. The paper is divided into three parts. First I am discussing my chosen approach and how it is connected to the notion of European identity. Secondly, I am presenting my research area of the Netherlands and Belgium, in order to reflect on European identity in the narrower context. Finally, I will present two research topics based on the discussion I have had throughout the paper.


Cultural/Memory approach

As my approach in this paper I have chosen “culture and memory” to explain European identity and identification. The notion of (a European) identity is closely linked to both concepts.
     For the memory-part of identity I am shortly explaining the concept of collective-, or social memory and its connection to identity. According to historian John Tosh, Social/Collective memory “accurately reflects the rationale of popular knowledge about the past”. All social groups with a mutual identity usually share the same interpretations and experiences about what has formed the group over time.  Thus, the focus of history is emphasized on certain events and important turning points to confirm the self image of a group (Tosh 3, 347).
     Collective memory is closely linked to culture. Collective ideas on the past are important in society, for “if the individual cannot exist without memory, neither can society, and that goes for large-scale technologically advanced societies too.” Today the social memory, and the identity within that, is created, and reserved, by contemporary cultural instances such as TV, school books and films (Tosh 4-5).
     When putting this into the wider European context, one could assume that the collective European identity, if such exist, could not exist before the notion of a somewhat peacefully united (Western) Europe after the Second World War, in order to be able to share the same memories.
     As for further explanation of the culture-part of European identity I am using a quote from the introduction of The Meaning of Europe by af Malmborg and Stråth, where the authors present their view on culture as follows:

“[T]he idea of culture as a unitary framework based on consensus, on core values, which are supposed to be embodied in European cultural identity, is wrong. The notion that social integration requires cultural cohesion in order to secure public commitment is wrong. (…) In the long run, the viable model for a European identification is one that challenges the exclusivist kind of cultural identity. The adjectives ‘European’ and ‘national’ are not alternatives but are articulated in the recognition of multi-identification. (5-6)”

Thus, af Malmborg and Stråth are critical to common “European cultural identity”. A possible European identity might be constructed by further European integration, but, if so, the created identity is then a part of a “multi-identification” where the European and the National identity are both important (af Malmborg and Stråth 1-25).


Research area

The books Europe: The Return of History (Tägil) and The Meaning of Europe (af Malmborg and Stråth) both focus on nations and their identities. The first has a more historical approach and therefore explains more of the processes of nation building in different countries within Europe. The second is more contemporary and instead explains the meanings of Europe in different national discourses. Only by looking at the content, both books have at least one thing in common: the countries which are picked as objects of analysis, for example Russia, Germany and France, are to a great extent the same. However, the focus on certain countries also gives that some countries, the same in both books, are excluded. The most remarkable in the European context would be the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) which are not specifically brought up in any of the books (af Malmborg and Stråth V-VI, Tägil 5-8).
After the Second World War, and before the creation of the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) and the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Benelux cooperation “inspired closer West European collaboration in the economic arena. Greater unity in the political and cultural spheres was reflected by the creation of the Council of Europe (Johansson 74)”. So, the Benelux-countries can be seen as the cradle of Europeanness, the EU and European integration (Wolinetz 84), and is also the centre of the EU. An obvious contemporary example is Brussels, but also the Court of Justice of the European Union situated in Luxembourg (Hay and Menon 183-188).
So, why are these three, small, original member states often excluded from literature on Europe? To connect all this back to culture/memory and European identity/identification, could it, in fact, be so that these authors see the Benelux countries as so originally European that the national meaning of Europe/the national identity is “just the same” as the European? Steven B. Wolinetz, writer of a chapter on Belgium and the Netherlands in European Politics, explains that:

“Europeanization has not been a major issue in the Netherlands or Belgium. Both countries are original EU-member states.(…) [They] not only supported the European integration, but also took the EU for granted.(Wolenetz 97)”

Or, a more personal, and therefore cultural, example of Europeanness in Belgium is my mother, born in Antwerp in 1965. To her the EU is something just as natural as Flanders, or Belgium or Benelux. She does not see the integration of the (Western) European countries as something negative, just as a natural benefit to be taken for granted. The EU (or EC by the time) has been a fact her whole life.
     To put the Benelux into context I will bring up three historical tendencies in the area in order to shed some light on its place in Europe today. Continuously my focus will mainly be on Belgium and the Netherlands.
First, it is notable to mention the early urban and modern progression within the area. From the late tenth century onwards Europe increased in trade and urbanisation, which gave consequences for the ongoing organization of territories. Cities and markets became the main focus. One of the most important trading areas of the High Middle ages was Flanders. The system of shifting much of the trade from rural-based markets to cities and the oceans, where the Dutch were important actors,  resembles more of a trade network similar to the ones today, than the feudal rural systems existing before (Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist 38-41, 53). In the Europe, and the world, of today the concept of networks is increasingly important. Territories and states are based upon geographical measurements and boundaries. Networks, on the other hand, “depict the geographical space as points (nodes) connected by lines (links)” (Ibid. 99).
     Secondly, both Belgium and the Netherland are very young in the geographical forms of today. They were separated from each other in 1831, and from there they started building new sovereign states (Delanty 74). However, the building of territorial identities looked very different in both countries. In short, Belgium is now fractured into three regions and can be defined as a federal multi-nation state, while the Netherlands is a united nation-state (Tägil 13-21).
     Thirdly, in the aftermaths of the Second World War the two leading actors were Germany and France, two former enemies trying to keep peace in Europe and increasing their cooperation. Only by looking at a map of Europe, one could see that the small countries of Belgium and the Netherland are somewhat “squeezed together” in between Germany and France, and “had no choice” but to automatically join the integration process (Johansson 74-75).
     To summarize these three, one could assume that the tight ties in the early networks of the Benelux area might have outlived the changes of the territorial borders. The Benelux cooperation represents this urban and closely connected network area, and did so before the creation of the ECSC, and inspired the other three original member states to integrate in the same way. The countries are physically small, yet include important urban areas, and could strategically, and geographically before the enlargements, become the centre of the new European cooperation; both the institutional centre, but maybe with that, also the cultural and “identity”-centre, where people are “just European”.


Research topics

With the background of the discussion above, I have come up with two research topics connected to culture/memory, European Identity/Identification and the Benelux countries, here, again, focusing only on the Netherlands and Belgium.
     The first research question reflects on the possible Europeanness in both countries:

Is there a difference in how “European” the Dutch and the Belgians feel?  

My hypothesis here is that, even though sometimes seen as the same in the European context and as original member states, the difference in attitude towards the EU in the Netherlands and Belgium has changed during the last few years. The Dutch are increasingly EU-sceptical and move away from the European integration. This can also be seen in the upcoming right-wing parties critical to immigration and further integration in the Netherlands (Wolinetz 97).
     As for Belgium I would like to further assume that the more fragmented a country is, in the past and present, the more it turns to greater powers, such as the EU, instead of its national government. Here I would like to compare Belgium and the Netherlands to the “big brothers” of France and Germany, where, throughout history, the long united France has been more EU-sceptics, whereas Germany, wounded by war and (always) fragmented have turned more to the EU, usually without any doubt. The same tendencies can be seen in the united Netherlands compared to the divided Belgium (Hay and Menon 151 -165).
     My second research question is focused only on Belgium, and the cultural effects of a federalised and divided country:

Is the feeling of Europeaness different between Flemish- and French speaking Belgians?

My hypothesis here is that the French speaking Walloons are more pro-EU than the Flemish. I would like to emphasize language as a big part of culture, and cultural (European) identity. Brussels has, since the creation of the EU and its centralization towards Brussels, become increasingly French-speaking. The number of English speakers coming from many member states to live and work in Brussels also increases constantly, which has given that the Flemish (Dutch) speaking society in Brussels has decreased (Janssens 1-14). I think the effects of this might be an increasing suspicion about the EU from Flemish speakers.
     Flanders is also the region in Belgium where the most separatist/nationalist movements and parties can be seen, which reveals a willingness to separate not only from the Walloons, but also the centralized Brussels of the EU (Wolenetz 96).




Works cited

Delanty, Gerard. Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1995. Print
Hay, Colin & Anand Menon. European Politics. Oxford University Press, 2007. Print

Janssens, Rudi. “Language use in Brussels and the position of Dutch: Some recent findings”. Brussels Studies. 2008:13. Web. 25 Feb. 2013. (http://www.brusselsstudies.be/medias/publications/EN_51_BruS13EN.pdf)

Jönsson, Christer, Sven Tägil and Gunnar Törnqvist. Organizing European Space. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2000. Print

af Malmborg, Mickael and Bo Stråth. “Introduction: The National Meanings of Europe.” The Meaning of Europe.Oxford: Berg, 2002: 1-25. Print.

Tosh, John with Sean Lang. The Pursuit of History. 4th ed.  Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2006. Print

Tägil, Sven. Europe: the Return of History. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2001. Print.
Wolinetz, Steven B. “Belgium and the Netherlands.” European Politics. Oxford University Press, 2007: 82-100. Print


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